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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A 
DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past two decades commercial arbitration has enjoyed 
steady growth as an informal alternative to civil litigation.1 The 
growth stems from the speed and cost efficiency of arbitration in 
contrast to civil litigation.2 Arbitration is also strongly favored 
by the courts to serve the important public policy of reducing 
the burden on the judiciary.3 In the last decade, federal and 
state courts have looked to this policy to permit an arbitrator to 
punish wrongdoers with punitive damages." 
This comment theorizes that awarding punitive damages in 
commercial arbitration is "state action"6 requiring due process.6 
Unlike the traditional contract remedy of compensatory dam-
1. R. COULSON. BUSINESS ARBITRATION - WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 8-9 (3d ed. 1986) 
(Commercial arbitration has increased by 250% since 1972). 
2. See Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 438 (1988). 
3. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) ("One thing an appellate judge 
learns very quickly is that a large part of all litigation in the courts is an exercise in 
futility and frustration. The anomaly is that there are better ways of resolving disputes, 
and we must in the public interest move toward taking a large volume of private conflicts 
out of the courts and into the channels of arbitration."). 
4. See Raytheon Company v. Automated Business Systems, Inc., 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 
1989); Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378 (11th Cir. 1988); Singer v. 
E.F. Hutton & Co., 699 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Peabody v. Rotan Mosie, Inc., 677 
F. Supp. 1135 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Ehrich v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 559 
(D.S.D. 1987); Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 76 N.C. App. 16, 331 S.E.2d 726 
(1985); Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 626, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676, 681 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1984); Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima, Int'l, 598 F. Supp. 353, 360 (N.D. 
Ala. 1984), aft'd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985); Willis v. Shearson/American Express, 569 
F. Supp. 821, 824 (M.D. N.C. 1983). 
5. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423 (1973) ("[TJhe com-
mands of the Fourteenth Amendment are addressed only to the State or to those acting 
under color of its authority."). 
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states "[nJo State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
the law." 
387 
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ages,' punitive damages have for centuries been under the exclu-
sive control of the State.8 The Supreme Court has found that a 
traditional and exclusive State power exercised by a private in-
dividual is "state action" requiring due process.9 Therefore when 
punitive damages are at issue, the arbitration agreement must 
consist of a minimum quantum of procedures that balance the 
protection against erroneous punishment with the State's inter-
est in limiting the burden on arbitration.10 
This comment also theorizes that punitive damages violate 
due process by giving the arbitrator unfettered discretion in de-
termining punitive damages awards. Unlike the traditional con-
tract remedy of compensatory damages that are calculated based 
on the amount of harm done,tl punitive damages are designed to 
punish and deter wrongful behavior.12 Punitive damages vastly 
exceed the amount of harm done and have no objective limits. 13 
In describing punitive damages awards inflicted by juries, Jus-
tice Rehnquist mentioned "[p]unitive damages are frequently 
based on the caprice and prejudice of jurors."14 Justice Marshall 
described punitive damages as "allow[ing] juries to penalize 
heavily the unorthodox and the unpopular and exact little from 
others."ui And most recently in Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haslip 18 the Supreme Court declared "[o]ne must concede that 
unlimited jury discretion or unlimited judicial discretion for that 
matter, in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme re-
sults that jar one's constitutional sensibilities."n Unlike jury tri-
als, the arbitrator is not required to use the correct punitive 
damages standard. The arbitrator is also not required to issue a 
7. See, e.g., Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng.Rep. 145 (1854). 
8. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354 (1976). 
9. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Amalgamated Food 
Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Evans v. Newton, 382 
U.S. 296 (1966); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 
(1944). 
10. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
11. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng.Rep. 145 (1854). 
12. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (Punitive damages "are not 
compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish 
reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence."). 
13. Id. 
14. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
15. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 83 (1971) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
16. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 59 U.S.L.W. 4157 (1991). 
17. Id. at 4161. 
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written OpinIOn, therefore judicial review is usually foreclosed. 
Thus, unfettered arbitrator discretion violates procedural due 
process. IS 
This comment will begin by discussing the statutory back-
ground of commercial arbitration and the limited judicial review 
of arbitration awards. It will then discuss the evolution of puni-
tive damages in commercial arbitration. This comment will then 
show that punitive damages are "state action" requiring proce-
dural due process. Finally, it will then use the Mathews u. El-
dridge I9 calculus created by the Supreme Court and the Haslip 
case to show that a written opinion and enhanced judicial review 
are needed to satisfy procedural due process when punitive dam-
ages are awarded in arbitration. 
II. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BACKGROUND 
A. ARBITRATION DEFINED 
Commercial arbitration is an informal dispute resolution 
mechanism created by contract. In the arbitration contract the 
parties choose a private person to hear their dispute and to re-
solve it by rendering a binding decision.20 
The scope of the arbitration agreement determines the re-
medial options that are available to the arbitrator. The scope is 
usually found in a clause that refers to the rules of an arbitra-
tion organization. For example, if the clause refers to the rules of 
the American Arbitration Association (AAA),21 then the scope 
will be "any remedy or relief which is just and equitable and 
18. Although due process can be waived when there is clear and compelling evidence 
of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver, See D. H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 
405 U.S. 174 (1972), a 'broad' arbitration clause does not rise to the Overmeyer standard, 
especially in light of the Supreme Court's declaration "indulge in every reasonable pre-
sumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and. . .not to presume ac-
quiesance in the loss of such rights." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
19. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
20. KANOWITZ, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, CASES AND MATERIALS 304 (1986). 
21. The American Arbitration Association's suggested clause: "Any controversy or 
claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by 
arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbi-
tration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered by the Arbitrator{s) may be 
entered in any Court having jurisdiction thereof." 
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within the terms of the agreement of the parties. "22 
B. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
The arbitration agreement is enforced by statute. The most 
important statute in this area is the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA).23 The FAA was established in 1925 as a body of federal 
substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an 
arbitration agreement. 24 
The FAA overcomes judicial hostility inherited from Eng-
land in enforcing arbitration contracts. 211 According to Congress 
"[t]he need for the law arises from ... the jealousy of the En-
glish courts for their own jurisdiction .... This jealousy sur-
vived for so long a period that the principle became firmly em-
bedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by 
the American courts. The courts have felt that the precedent 
was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative 
enactment. . . "26 
The FAA is based on the federal commerce power and 
makes a written contract to arbitrate "in any ... contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving interstate commerce ... valid, ir-
revocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."27 Therefore 
the FAA becomes applicable when there is a written agreement 
to arbitrate and the contract containing the arbitration agree-
ment evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce. 
22. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES OF AMERI-
CAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION § 43 (1990), 
23. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). 
24. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24 
(1983) (The FAA created "a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable 
to any arbitration agreement" within its power.). 
25. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) (quoting H. R. Rep No. 96, 
68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1924)). 
26.ld. 
27. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). See, e.g., Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 401 
(1966) (A written arbitration agreement was enforced under the Federal Arbitration Act. 
Prima Paint serviced 175 clients in numerous states and obtained the consulting services 
of Flood & Conklin to assist in the transfer of sales and manufacturing operations from 
New Jersey to Maryland. The Court held the Federal Arbitration Act applicable under § 
2. Justice Fortas wrote "There could not be a clearer case of a contract evidencing a 
transaction in interstate commerce."). 
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The drafters of the FAA were motivated by the important 
advantages of arbitration. First, arbitration of contract disputes 
saves time and money in contrast to litigation.28 Second, an arbi-
trator has special expertise to decide contract questions.29 Third, 
arbitration reduces the burden on the judiciary. 30 As a result of 
these advantages, the Supreme Court has declared a strong fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration.31 
C. LIMITED JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The strong policy favoring arbitration has resulted in the 
insulation of arbitration awards by the judiciary. For example, 
in Wilko v. Swan32 the Supreme Court created the "manifest 
disregard" doctrine.33 This doctrine is an extension of the lim-
ited basis for vacating an arbitration award under the FAA.34 
28. Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 269 
(1926). 
29. [d. 
30. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924) (According to the House of 
Representatives the FAA was needed "at this time when there is so much agitation 
against the costliness and delays of litigation. These matters can be largely eliminated by 
agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are made valid and enforceable."). 
31. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24 
(1983). 
32. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
33. [d. at 436-437. 
34. 9 U.S.C.A. §10 (West 1970). The Federal Arbitration Act provides for a modifi-
cation or correction of an award under the following circumstances: 
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material 
mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award. 
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it 
is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted. 
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the 
controversy. 
The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof, and 
promote justice between the parties. 
The Federal Arbitration Act states that an award may be vacated under the following 
circumstances: 
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means. 
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them. 
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, 
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the 
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been 
prejudiced. 
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly exeuted them that a 
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. 
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the 
award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by 
5
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The doctrine dictates that an arbitration award is vacated when 
an arbitrator understood and correctly stated, yet completely ig-
nored the law.311 The standard goes beyond mere error in the law 
or failure of the arbitrator to understand or apply the law.36 The 
court cannot vacate an arbitration award just because of an "ar-
guable difference regarding the meaning or applicability of laws 
urged upon it."37 
In many instances, an arbitration award is further insulated 
by a lack of a transcript or written opinion. The policy of the 
AAA is to insure finality by putting pressure on its arbitrators 
not to write opinions but to merely state the award in dollar 
amounts.S8 
In Wilko, the Supreme Court legitimized the policy of the 
AAA by declaring an arbitration award "may be made without 
explanation of their reasons and without a complete record of 
their proceedings. "39 The Court reaffirmed this position in Bern-
hardt u. Polygraphic CO.40 stating arbitrators "need not give 
their reasons for their results."4! A federal court justified the in-
sulation of arbitration awards in Sobel u. Hertz Warner & CO.:42 
[A] requirement that arbitrators explain their 
reasoning in every case would help to uncover 
egregious failures to apply the law to an arbi-
trated dispute. But such a rule would undermine 
the very purpose of arbitration, which is to pro-
vide a relatively quick, efficient, and informal 
means of private dispute settlement. 43 
Therefore, the courts have found finality is more important 
than accuracy in preserving the usefulness of arbitration. 
the arbitrators. 
35. Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs International Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582 
(2d Cir. 1967). 
36.Id. 
37. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 934 (2d 
Cir. 1986). 
38. See Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 439 (1988). 
39. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953). 
40. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956). 
41. Id. at 203. 
42. Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972). 
43. Id. at 1214. 
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D. LEGISLATIVE INTENT ON THE SCOPE OF ARBITRABLE ISSUES 
Implicit in the insulation of an arbitration award from judi-
cial review is that the scope of arbitrable issues is limited to or-
dinary contract disputes. The legislative intent is evident in an 
article44 written by an FAA drafter: 
Not all questions arising out of contracts ought to 
be arbitrated. It is a remedy peculiarly suited to 
the disposition of the ordinary disputes between 
merchants as to questions of fact- quantity, qual-
ity, time of delivery, compliance with terms of 
payment, excuses for non-performance, and the 
like. It has a place also in the determination of 
the simpler questions of law- the questions of law 
which arise out of these daily relations between 
merchants as to passage of title, the existence of 
warranties, or the questions of law which are com-
plementary to the questions of fact which we have 
just mentioned. It is not the proper method for 
deciding points of law of major importance in-
volving constitutional questions or policy in the 
application of statutes.4G 
Traditionally, ordinary contract disputes consisted of "make 
whole" remedies such as compensatory damages.46 Punitive 
damages were prohibited.47 The recent introduction of punitive 
damages into contract disputes48 created a problem for the 
courts: In light of the informal procedures and limited judicial 
review consistent with the arbitration of "ordinary contract dis-
putes," does an arbitrator have the power to punish a party to a 
contract with punitive damages? 
44. Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 281 
(1926). 
45. [d. 
46. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 589 (3rd ed. 1987). 
47. [d. 
48. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752 
(1984). 
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION 
A. GARRITY PROHIBITS PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ARBITRATION 
In the landmark case of Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.,,,e the 
New York Court of Appeals found punitive damages in commer-
cial arbitration violate public policy.IIO The court, after finding 
punitive damages to be non-compensatory and therefore a coer-
cive sanction,1I1 based its holding on two factors. First, the use of 
coercive force is under the exclusive control of the State.1I2 Sec-
ond, arbitration awards are not vacated upon an error in law or 
fact and therefore "amount to an unlimited draft upon judicial 
power."113 The Garrity court concluded "[t]he freedom to con-
tract does not embrace the freedom to punish, even by 
contract. "114 
The Garrity court used public policy to balance the weight 
of promoting arbitration of disputes with the weight of limited 
judicial review of punitive damage awards. In Garrity the bal-
ance weighed in favor of the limited judicial review resulting in 
the prohibition of punitive damages. Other courts, however, 
have balanced the public policy scale differently. 
B. THE SUPREME COURT EXPANDS THE SCOPE OF ARBITRABLE 
ISSUES 
Since Garrity, the Supreme Court, without considering the 
issue of punitive damages, has used the strong policy favoring 
arbitration to expand the scope of arbitrable issues. In Moses H. 
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.1I11 the 
Supreme Court found that courts must broadly construe the 
scope of an arbitration agreement in favor of the arbitrator's 
49. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354 (1976). 
50. [d. at 355. See also Fahnstock & Co. v. Waltman, No. 90 Civ. 1792 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. DeFluiter, 456 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1983); Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assoes., 102 N.M. 607, 698 P.2d 880 (N.M. 1985). 
51. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 355 (1976). 
52. [d. at 358. 
53. [d. 
54. [d. 
55. Moses H. Cone Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1982). 
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power.G6 
For example in Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc. G7 the Supreme Court, following its own precedent in Moses 
H. Cone, permitted the arbitration of a treble damages anti-
trust claim.GB In Shearson/American Express v. McMahon/,e af-
ter citing Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court permitted the ar-
bitration of a treble damages RICO claim.60 
In both Mitsubishi and McMahon the Supreme Court was 
careful to note that the treble damages were primarily compen-
satory.61 The Supreme Court was therefore speaking to the arbi-
tration of non-punitive claims when they declared "[t]he stream-
lined procedures of arbitration do not entail any consequential 
restriction on substantive rights. "62 
C. THE COURTS PERMIT PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ARBITRATION 
Most federal and state courts considering the issue of puni-
tive damages in arbitration have cited the strong policy favoring 
arbitration and then proceeded to permit the arbitrator to award 
punitive damages.B3 Unlike Garrity, these courts have found the 
56. [d. at 24-25 (The strong federal policy favoring arbitration was articulated: "The 
Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the 
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration ... " The Court also 
mentioned that "under the Federal Arbitration Act. . .arbitration clauses should be read 
broadly and arbitration should not be denied in the absence of clear and express 
exclusions."). 
57. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
58. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
59. Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
60. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
61. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 
(1985) (The treble damages "seeks primarily to enable an injured competitor to gain 
compensation for that injury."); Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 
240 (1987) ( "The legislative history of § 1964 (c) reveals the same [as Mitsubishi treble-
damages) emphasis on the remedial role of the treble-damages provision."). 
62. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
63. See Raytheon Company v. Automated Business Systems, Inc., 882 F.2d 6 (1st 
Cir. 1989); Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378 (11th Cir. 1988); Singer v. 
E.F. Hutton & Co., 699 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Peabody v. Rotan MosIe, Inc., 677 
F. Supp. 1135 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Ehrich v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 559 
(D.S.D. 1987); Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 76 N.C. App. 16, 331 S.E.2d 726 
(1985); Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 626, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676, 681 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1984); Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima, Int'l, 598 F. Supp. 353, 360 (N.D. 
9
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public policy balance weighs in favor of promoting arbitration by 
including a broad range of remedies. 
For example, in Willis v. Shearson/American Express, 
Inc.,s. the federal court after looking to the Supreme Court prin-
ciple articulated in Moses H. Cone, that "any doubts concerning 
the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbi-
tration,"811 found punitive damages were included in the broad 
arbitration agreement.88 The Willis court did not find any "pub-
lic policy reason persuasive enough to justify prohibiting arbitra-
tors from resolving issues of punitive damages submitted by 
parties."87 
The court in Willoughby Roofing & Supply v. Kajima In-
ternational88 agreed with the Willis court. The Willoughby 
court reasoned that arbitration can only be viable if it can han-
dle all the disputes that arise under the agreement. The Wil-
loughby court concluded "[t]o deny arbitrators the full range of 
remedial tools generally available under the law would be to 
hamstring arbitrators and to lessen the value and efficiency of 
arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution."89 
Unlike Garrity, the Willoughby court found the public policy of 
promoting arbitration, by including a full range of remedies, out-
weighed the limited judicial review of punitive damages awards. 
Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985); Willis v. Shearson/American Express, 569 
F. Supp. 821, 824 (M.D.N.C. 1983). But see Fahnstock & Co. v. Waltman, No. 90 Civ. 
1792 (S.D.N. Y. 1990); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. DeFluiter, 456 N.E.2d 
429 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assocs., 102 N.M. 607, 698 P.2d 880 (N.M. 
1985). 
64. Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 569 F.Supp. 821 (M.D.N.C.1983). 
65. [d. at 823 (citing Moses H. Cone Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
24-25 (1982». . 
66. [d. at 823. 
67. [d. at 824. 
68. Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co., Inc. v. Kajima, 598 F.Supp 353 (N.D.Ala 
1984). See also Raytheon Company v. Automated Business Systems, Inc., 882 F.2d 6 
(1989) ("Where such conduct could give rise to punitive damages if proved to a court, 
there is no compelling reason to prohibit a party which proves the same conduct to 8 
panel of arbitrators from recovering the same damages."). 
69. [d. at 362. 
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IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION VIOLATE DUE PROCESS 
A. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IS "STATE 
ACTION" REQUIRING DUE PROCESS 
There must be "state action"70 for the due process clause71 
to be invoked. Although an arbitrator is considered to be a pri-
vate party, "state action" exists when private conduct involves 
the exercise of power that was "traditionally the exclusive pre-
rogative of the state."72 In Flagg Bros. Inc. u. Brooks the Su-
preme Court was careful to emphasize that although "many 
functions have been traditionally performed by governments, 
very few have been exclusively reserved to the state. "73 
An arbitrator awarding punitive damages is a good example 
of a private party exercising traditional and exclusive State 
power. 
Garrity supports this view. The public policy concerns in 
Garrity were based on a private arbitrator using a traditional 
and exclusive State power in the form of punitive damages: 
[If an arbitrator was to award punitive damages] 
a tradition of the rule of law in organized society 
is violated. One purpose of the rule of law is to 
require that the use of coercion be controlled by 
the State. In a highly developed commercial and 
economic society the use of private force is not 
the danger, but the uncontrolled use of coercive 
economic sanctions in private arrangements. For 
centuries the power to punish has been a monop-
oly of the State, and not that of any private indi-
vidual. The day is long past since barbaric man 
achieved redress by private punitive measures.'· 
70. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423 (1973) ("[T]he commands of 
the Fourteenth Amendment are addressed only to the State or to those acting under 
color of its authority. "). 
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 states "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
the law." 
72. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974). 
73. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). 
74. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 359 (1976). 
11
Rothken: Punitive Damages
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991
398 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:387 
An arbitrator awarding punitive damages can be understood 
only by State delegation of this traditional and exclusive power. 
This can be seen in the distinction between an arbitrator award-
ing compensatory damages and punitive damages. Compensa-
tory damages are a result of the interaction between autonomous 
parties'. Claims based on personal interaction can be removed 
from judicial administration.711 
Punitive damages, on the other hand, use the breaching 
party's liability as a means of achieving the extrinsic social goal 
of punishment and deterrence.76 Punitive damages can be seen 
as having been grafted onto the contractual relationship by the 
State.77 The parties to an arbitration agreement "have no power 
to structure, even indirectly, an autonomous resolution to an is-
sue whose contours. . .go distinctly beyond their own interac-
tions. "78 Punitive damages must therefore be imposed from 
without, by the State, as it is not within the domain of the par-
ties direct interchange.79 
Therefore, the removal of punitive damages from the judici-
ary into a private arbitral forum can only be explained and per-
mitted by State conferra1.8o "Absent legislative conferral of [pu-
nitive damages] authority on some other [forum], removal of the 
distributive power from the judiciary is inconceivable as, say, an 
attempt to establish the private assessment and collection of 
tax."81 
The courts by enforcing an arbitration award of punitive 
damages remove the traditional State monopoly on the use of 
punitive damages. The arbitrator's use of this traditional and 
exclusive State power constitutes "state action" invoking the 
due process clause. 
75. Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights: An Approach to the Arbi-
trability Question, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1075 (1987). 
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979). See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1973) (Punitive damages are not compensation for injury. 
"Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and 
to deter its future occurrence."). 
77. Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights: An Approach to the Arbi-
trability Question, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1080 (1987). 
78. Id. at 1081. 
79. Id. at 1075. 
80.Id. 
81. Id. 
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B. MATHEWS CALCULUS REQUIRES ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES IN 
ARBITRATION 
In Mathews v. Eldridge82 the Supreme Court created a bal-
ancing test for determining the constitutional adequacy of a par-
ticular set of procedures. The following factors are weighed: 
First, the private interest that will be impacted by the official 
action.8S Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private 
interest through the procedures used and the probable value of 
enhanced procedural safeguards.84 Third, the Government's in-
terest, including the function involved and the fiscal and admin-
istrative burdens that the enhanced procedural requirement 
would entail. 86 
1. The Private Interest at Stake is Enormous 
The property and liberty interests at stake are enormous. 
The property interest in the form of a monetary penalty has no 
limit. Unlike compensatory damages tliat correlate with the 
harm done, punitive damages are based on highly discretionary 
standards of punishment and deterrence.86 As a result, the arbi-
trator can bankrupt a party.87 
A liberty interest is involved since punitive damages can 
harm reputation.88 Punitive damages have been described as 
quasi-criminal,89 and some commentators have even proposed 
82. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
83. Id. at 335. 
84.Id. 
85.Id. 
86. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1973) (In most jurisdic-
tions jury discretion over the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle rule that 
they not be excessive. Consequently, juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredict-
able amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused."); Bankers Life & 
Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988) ("[T]his grant of wholly standard less dis-
cretion to determine the severity of when, where, or how much, violates fundamental due 
process."). 
87. See generally Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 59 U.S.L.W. 4157, 4171 
(1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[A] jury would not exceed its discretion under [Ala-
bama] state law by imposing an award of punitive damages that was deliberately calcu-
lated to bankrupt the defendant."). 
88. Wisconsin v. Constantine au, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); Board of Regents v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). 
89. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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applying criminal safeguards to punitive damages cases.90 The 
serious potential punishment from punitive damages requires a 
high degree of precision by the arbitrator in his determination.91 
2. There is a High Risk of Erroneous Deprivation 
In contrast to the high degree of precision required in the 
determination of punitive damages, there is practically no pro-
tection against erroneous deprivation from an arbitration award 
of punitive damages. At best an arbitrator is given unfettered 
freedom to choose a penalty under inherently vague punitive 
damage laws. At worst an arbitrator can ignore the law com-
pletely, and given the lack of written opinion and judicial re-
view, he can act as a super-legislator, rendering punitive awards 
based on his own value system rather than society's. 
The Garrity court, in support of its finding that arbitral 
awards of punitive damages violate public policy, pointed to in-
adequate judicial review as a critical factor: 
The trouble with an arbitration admitting a 
power to grant unlimited damages by way of pun-
ishment is that if the court treated such an award 
in the way arbitration awards are usually treated, 
and followed the award to the letter, it would 
amount to an unlimited draft upon judicial 
power. In the usual case, the court stops only to 
inquire if the award is authorized by the contract; 
is complete and final on its face; and if the pro-
ceeding was fairly conducted.92 
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. u. Burke,93 
Judge Legge was concerned by a punitive damages award that 
was unaccompanied by an arbitrator opinion and thereby fore-
closed judicial review. After following the precedent permitting 
arbitrators to render awards without a written opinion Judge 
Legge commented: 
90. See, e.g., Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages 
Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983). 
91. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975). 
92. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 358 (1976) (quoting Matter of Pub· 
lishers' Association of N.Y. City, 280 A:pp.Div. 500, 503 (1952». 
93. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Burke, 741 F.Supp 191 (N.D. Cal 
1990). 
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Indeed, some thought about the future of this 
type of arbitration appears to be necessary. If in-
dustry arbitration, such as this within the invest-
ment industry, is to become a substitute for civil 
litigation ... then the arbitrators and counsel 
must be aware of the necessity for giving a federal 
court some record for review that is more than 
just a statement of the amount of the award. This 
court does not suggest that arbitrators be obliged 
to make findings of fact and conclusions of law 
equivalent to those required of a trial court. But 
the mere granting of a monetary award, without 
more, combined with the limited power of a fed-
eral court to review it, creates both uncertainty 
and secrecy which is undesirable as an alternative 
dispute resolution.s• 
401 
3. The High Risk of Erroneous Deprivation tS Easily 
Remedied 
The uncertainty and secrecy of a punitive damages award in 
arbitration can be easily remedied. The arbitrator can use the 
State standard for punitive damages and then write a brief opin-
ion justifying the punitive damages award. This will permit judi-
cial review. The judiciary can then look at the size of award, and 
in light of the arbitral opinion, determine if the award exceeds 
the amount needed to punish and deter the unacceptable 
behavior. 
Although the case dealt with juries instead of arbitrators, 
the Supreme Court in Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip95 
placed particular emphasis on the need for judicial review of pu-
nitive damages awards. In Has lip , after commenting that unfet-
tered jury discretion in determining punitive damages invites 
"extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities,"96 the 
Supreme Court found appropriate jury instructions in combina-
tion with heightened judicial review passed the constitutional 
challenge.97 
94. Id. at 195. 
95. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 59 U.S.L.W. 4157 (1991). 
96. Id. at 4161. 
97. Id. at 4162. 
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The Court found three factors to be important. First, the 
jury instructions were confined to the State policy of punish-
ment and deterrence.98 Second, the trial court had to give rea-
sons in the record for refusing to lower a jury verdict.99 Third, 
there was substantial judicial review using detailed standards to 
make sure that a punitive damages award does "not exceed an 
amount that will accomplish society's goals of punishment and 
deterrence. "100 
These same standards will be useful in the arbitration of 
punitive damages. An arbitrator, like the Haslip jury, must use 
the State standard for punitive damages. This will limit arbitra-
tor discretion to the specific punitive damages standard in the 
jurisdiction. 
An arbitrator, similar to the Haslip trial court, must issue 
written reasons to justify the punitive damages award. This will 
permit judicial review. The written reasons will also for~e the 
arbitrator to reflect on his decision and therefore result in a 
more accurate punitive damages award.101 Additionally, written 
reasons will serve the policy of punishment and deterrence by 
enabling the wrongdoer to learn with specificity the unaccept-
able conduct.102 
The judiciary, as in Haslip, can then use the arbitrator's 
opinion to determine if the punitive damages award is consistent 
with the State policy of punishment and deterrence. The judici-
ary will be able to compare punitive damages awards from arbi-
trators and juries to insure the consistency of all punitive dam-
ages awards. 
98.Id. 
99.Id. 
100. Id. 
101. See Scauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 580 (1987). 
102. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 713, 761 (2nd ed. 1988) 
(describing the "right not to be singled out for hurtful treatment by the state without a 
chance to talk back. and to be told why"). 
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4. The Additional Procedures of the Correct Punitive Stan-
dard, a Written Opinion, and Judicial Review are a Small Bur-
den on Arbitration 
The three added procedures-requiring the correct punitive 
damages standard, a written arbitral opinion, and judicial re-
view, are a small burden on arbitration compared to the added 
accuracy they bring to the decisionmaking process. First, the re-
quirement of following the correct punitive standard is a very 
small burden considering that arbitrators already must follow 
"some" standard in their decision. Second, the written opinion is 
a small burden since it is only required in the few instances 
when punitive damages are awarded. Third, although judicial re-
view impacts on the arbitral policy of reducing the burden on 
the judiciary, judicial review is not mandatory and the review 
process is quite brief compared to the burden caused by a jury 
trial determination of punitive damages. Therefore, the burden 
on the arbitration process is outweighed by the greatly enhanced 
accuracy of punitive damages awards. 
5. The State has no Legitimate Interest in a Speedy and Cost 
Efficient Arbitration that Results in Arbitrary Punishment 
The State has no legitimate interest in a speedy and cost 
efficient arbitration process that results in erroneous penalties. 
"It is anomalous, and counter to deep-rooted legal principles 
and common-sense notions, to punish persons who meant no 
harm ..... "103 A written opinion and the subsequent possibility 
of meaningful judicial review will permit an arbitrator to award 
a "full range of remedies"104 and therefore provide the best bal-
ance between maintaining the efficacy of commercial arbitration 
and protecting against erroneous punitive awards. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Arbitration is a dispute resolution mechanism created by 
contract and as such can effectuate the intent of the parties. Pu-
103. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 87·88 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
104. Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co., Inc. v. Kajima, 598 F.Supp 353, 362 (N.D. 
Ala 1984). 
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nitive damages are a creation of the State and serve the distrib-
utive purpose of punishment and deterrance by supercompen-
sating the injured party. When courts permit arbitrators to 
award punitive damages, they take the traditional and exclusive 
coercive power of the State and enforce a determination by a 
private arbitrator. The private use of punitive damages therefore 
constitutes "state action" and triggers due process protection 
against arbitrary government action. 
An arbitration award of punitive damages violates due pro-
cess by giving the arbitrator unacceptable discretion. There are 
virtually no safeguards to protect against an arbitrator making a 
mistake. An arbitration award will not be disturbed unless there 
was a "manifest disregard" of the law. Due to the lack of a writ-
ten opinion, judicial review is usually foreclosed. 
The Mathews calculus balances the weight of the proce-
dures needed to prevent erroneous deprivation against the 
weight of preserving the finality and efficacy of arbitration. The 
balance dictates that the Haslip factors must be followed. An 
arbitrator· must use the correct punitive damages standard, and 
an award of punitive damages must be accompanied by a written 
opinion. Judicial review will then be available to use objective 
criteria to insure the punitive damages award does not exceed 
the amount needed to punish and deter wrongdoers. The burden 
of these added procedures on arbitration is small in light of the 
increased accuracy of punitive damages awards. Thus, the Wil-
loughby policy of promoting arbitration by making available a 
"full range of remedial tools,"lOI! and the Garrity policy of 
prohibiting an "unlimited draft upon judicial power,"106 are 
reconciled. 
Ira P. Rothken* 
105. [d. 
106. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 358 (1976) (quoting Matter of Pub-
lishers' Association of N.Y. City, 280 App.Div. 500, 503 (1952)). 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992. 
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